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1. ME. R. CRIM. P. 11 (Pleas; Acceptance of a Plea to a Charge of a Class C or Higher Crime).
2. This name is a creation of the author.  It is not intended as a representation of any person living,
or deceased.
3. An open plea, also called a blind plea, is a guilty plea made “without the promise of a concession
from either the judge or the prosecutor.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (3d Pocket ed. 1996).
4. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401(1)(A) (2006) (“A person is guilty of burglary if . . . [t]he
person enters or surreptitiously remains in a structure knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged
to do so, with the intent to commit a crime therein.”).
5. Id. § 353(1)(A) (“A person is guilty of theft if . . . [t]he person obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with intent to deprive the other person of the property.”).
6. Id. § 802(1)(A) (“A person is guilty of arson if he starts, causes, or maintains a fire or explosion
. . . [o]n the property of another with the intent to damage or destroy property thereon . . . .”).  Jonathan
Lowell burglarized a machine shop where he previously worked.  Upon leaving the shop, he set fire to his
former boss’s office.
7. Id. § 401(1)(B)(4) (stating that if the violation is “against a structure that is a dwelling place,” the
violation “is a Class B crime.”).
8. Id. § 401(1)(A) (“Violation of this paragraph is a Class C crime . . . .”).
9. Id. § 353(1)(B)(2) (if the property stolen is “a firearm or an explosive device,” the violation “is a
Class B crime.”).
10. Id.  § 353(1)(B)(1) (if the property stolen is valued at “more than $10,000,” the violation “is a Class
B crime.”).
11. Id. § 353(1)(B)(4) (if the property stolen is valued at “more than $1,000 but not more than
$10,000,” the violation “is a Class C crime.”).
12. Id. § 353(1)(B)(5) (if the property stolen is valued at “more than $500 but not more than $1,000,”
the violation “is a Class D crime.”).
13. Id. § 802(3) (“Arson is a Class A crime.”).
THINKING INSIDE THE BOX:  PLACING FORM
OVER FUNCTION IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTORY SENTENCING PROCEDURE IN STATE
OF MAINE v. EUGENE DOWNS
Matthew E. Lane*
I.  IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
Consider the following hypothetical:  You are a Maine Superior Court justice
sitting in Waldo County.  As you don your robe and proceed to the court room, you are
keenly aware of your responsibility today.  Today you will be presiding over a
sentencing hearing.  A week ago, you presided over a Rule 111 proceeding in which
Jonathan Lowell2 entered an open guilty plea3  to eighteen counts of burglary4 and
theft,5 and one count of arson.6  Over the course of five months, Mr. Lowell had
engaged in what can only be described as a crime spree.  The counts break down as
follows:  six counts of Class B burglary of a dwelling place or residence;7 three counts
of Class C burglary of a business;8 one count of Class B theft of a firearm;9 one count
of  Class B theft;10 five counts of Class C theft;11 two counts of Class D theft;12 and one
count of Class A arson.13  Mr.Lowell has no prior criminal record.
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14. See generally id. § 1151 (2006).  This statute describes the purposes of criminal sentencing as
follows:
1.  To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the rehabilitation of
convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons when required in the interest
of public safety; 
2.  To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can be compensated and other
purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served. [sic] 
3.  To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further criminality; 
4.  To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on the
conviction of a crime;
5.  To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological
goals;
6.  To encourage differentiation among offenders with a view to a just individualization
of sentences;
7.  To promote the development of correctional programs which elicit the cooperation of
convicted persons; and
8.  To permit sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses, with reference to the
factors, among others, of:
A.  The age of the victim; and
B.  The selection by the defendant of the person against whom the crime was
committed or of the property that was damaged or otherwise affected by the
crime because of the race, color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, physical
or mental disability, sexual orientation or homelessness of that person or of the
owner or occupant of that property.
Id. 
15. Id. § 1151(1).
16. Id. § 1151(3).
17. See id. § 1151(4).
18. See id. § 1151(5).
19. Id. § 1151(6).
20. Id. § 1151(8).
21. Id. § 1151(2).
22. ME. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(3) (“If the court imposes a sentence of one year or more, it shall set forth on
the record the reasons for the sentence.”).
23. Id. 32(c)(2) (requiring that “[t]he report . . . shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant
and such information on the defendant’s characteristics, the defendant’s financial condition, and the
circumstances affecting the defendant’s behavior”).
In the week leading up to the sentencing hearing, you have been burdened with the
task of sorting through the various offenses and attempting to impose a sentence that
meets the purposes of criminal sentencing found in the Maine Criminal Code.14  You
have sought to impose a sentence that will balance the appropriate deterrent effect and
the required restraint of Mr. Lowell in the interest of public safety15 with the goal of
minimizing correctional experiences which might promote further criminality.16
Moreover, you want to promote general deterrence17 and uniformity of sentences18
while still imposing a differentiated sentence to facilitate equitable individualization
of sentences.19  In addition, you must also ensure that the sentence does not diminish
the gravity of the convicted criminal conduct20 and at the same time encourage
restitution whenever possible.21  Pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, if
you impose a sentence of one year or more, you must set forth on the record the
reasons for that sentence.22  
As you sift through possible prison terms and review the pre-sentence
investigation report,23 you examine your options in setting the final sentence for
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24. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C (2006).
25. 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993).
26. The Criminal Law Advisory Commission exists “for the purpose of conducting a continuing study
of the criminal law in Maine.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1351 (2006).  It is a nine-member panel
appointed by the Attorney General by virtue of their knowledge and experience in the criminal law.  Id. §
1352(1).  
27. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1354(2) (2006) (“The commission shall submit to the Legislature,
at the start of each session, such changes in the criminal laws and in related provisions as the commission
may deem appropriate.”).
28. P.L. 1995, ch. 69, §1; see also L.D. 542, Statement of Fact (117th Me. Legis. 1995) (“This bill
enacts into positive law the Law Court’s 3-step sentencing procedure for felonies, established in State v.
Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993), when imposing a sentence alternative involving a term of
imprisonment.”).
29. See L.D. 542, Comm. Amend. A, Statement of Fact (117th Me. Legis. 1995).  The final sentence
of the Legislature’s original codification of Hewey step three read: “The [sentencing] court shall specify
the place of imprisonment or commitment to the Department of Corrections.”  L.D. 542 (117th Me. Legis.
1995).  This sentence was stricken from the statute by the Criminal Justice and Public Safety Committee
because “it [was] not part of the 3-step sentencing procedure and [was] only misleading.”  L.D. 542, Comm.
Amend. A, Statement of Fact (117th Me. Legis. 1995).
30. Compare P.L. 1995, ch. 70, §1 (enacting section 1252-C), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
1252-C (2006).
nineteen serious offenses.  In the interest of fairness and efficiency, you decide that it
is appropriate to reach a sentence that considers the broader course of the offender’s
conduct.  With this in mind, how will you articulate your sentencing calculation?  The
framework of the analysis has been supplied by the Legislature.24  Title 17-A, section
1252-C of the Maine Revised Statutes was enacted in 1995, when the 117th Maine
Legislature sought to make the Law Court’s articulated sentencing procedure in State
v. Hewey25 part of the criminal code.  Pursuant to title 17-A, section 1354, subsection
2, the Criminal Law Advisory Commission (CLAC)26 submitted to the Legislature a
bill that made the Law Court’s process part of the criminal code.27  As a result, An Act
to Include the Law Court’s Imprisonment Sentencing Procedure in the Maine Criminal
Code was enacted.28  The Legislature took pains to make sure the codification was
simply a statutory replication of the procedure in Hewey and nothing more.29  In the
twelve years since its enactment, the statute has not been amended.30  The statute
currently reads as follows:
§ 1252-C. SENTENCING PROCEDURE RELATING TO THE IMPOSITION OF IMPRISONMENT.
In imposing a sentence alternative pursuant to section 1152 that includes a term
of imprisonment relative to murder, a Class A, Class B or Class C crime, in setting
the appropriate length of that term as well as any unsuspended portion of that term
accompanied by a period of probation, the court shall employ the following 3-step
process:
1.  The court shall first determine the basic term of imprisonment by considering
the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.
2.  The court shall next determine the maximum period of imprisonment to be
imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and
mitigating, appropriate to that case.  These sentencing factors include, but are not
limited to, the character of the offender and the offender’s criminal history, the effect
of the offence on the victim and the protection of the public interest.
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31. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C(1)-(3) (2006).
32. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1155. The court overturned the sentence because the judge had miscalculated
the maximum period of incarceration.  The “original” sentence limit for a Class A offense was twenty years,
while the “extended” limit, at the time, was forty.  Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(A)
(1983 & Supp. 1992)).  In the sentencing of Class A offenses, the extended period of incarceration is
reserved for the “most heinous and violent crimes committed against a person.”  State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d
149, 151 (Me. 1991).  Because the court found that Hewey’s crime could not be viewed as one of the most
heinous and violent crimes against a person, it was an error in principle for the sentencing judge to impose
on Hewey a maximum period of incarceration of any amount over twenty years.  Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1155.
33. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154.
34. Id.  The three part procedure was developed in prior case law.  See, e.g., State v. Weir, 600 A.2d
1105, 1106 (Me. 1991) (citing Lewis, 590 A.2d at 150, for the proposition that the basic sentence should
be set “by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense, without regard to the
circumstances of the offender”).
35. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154.
36. See id. at 1155.
37. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 11, 745 A.2d 368, 372.
38. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154.
39. Id. (quoting Weir, 600 A.2d at 1106); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C(1) (2006)
(codifying the first step of the Hewey analysis).
40. State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 224 (Me. 1992) (quoting State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618, 621 (Me.
1990)).
3.  The court shall finally determine what portion, if any, of the maximum period
of imprisonment should be suspended and, if a suspension order is to be entered,
determine the appropriate period of probation to accompany that suspension.31
In State v. Hewey, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the sentencing
court erred in imposing a sentence that exceeded the maximum applicable period of
incarceration for a Class A crime and accordingly vacated the sentence.32  Perhaps
more importantly, the Law Court used the case as an “opportunity for clarification of
[its] review of an appeal from a sentence imposed by the trial court.”33  A unanimous
court sought to clear up some inconsistencies in previous decisions regarding “the
terminology used to define each of the three steps” of the sentencing process by better
describing the procedure “by which the significant purposes [of criminal sanction] and
relevant factors may be articulated by the trial court in an individual case.”34
Moreover, the court opined that the three steps were “necessary . . . to achieve a greater
uniformity in the sentencing process and to enable [the Law Court] to apply the correct
standard of review to each of those steps.”35  The court’s decision in Hewey was an
attempt to help sentencing judges more clearly articulate their sentencing rationale
which would allow for more efficient review.36  The resulting process is commonly
referred to as the Hewey analysis.37
In applying the Hewey analysis to Jonathan Lowell’s case, you must first
determine the “basic period of incarceration.”38  The basic period of incarceration is
calculated “solely by reference to the offender’s criminal conduct in committing the
crime, that is, by ‘considering the particular nature of the offense without regard to the
circumstances of the offender.’”39  Law Court precedent has illuminated that you
should place the criminal conduct “on a continuum for each type of offense ‘to
determine which act justifies the imposition of the most extreme punishment.’”40  For
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41. Id. at 225.  Corbett was convicted of aggravated trafficking in scheduled drugs, which is a Class
A crime.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1103, 1105-A (2006).
42. Corbett, 618 A.2d at 224.
43. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154.
44. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(6) (2006).
45. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154.  Section 1252-C, subsection 2, enumerates a non-exclusive list of factors
including the “offender’s criminal history.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C(2) (2006).  Returning
to Corbett as an example, the court found that the defendant’s involvement in the Lewiston drug trade for
many years was an aggravating factor “properly considered only after the basic sentence [was] determined.”
Corbett, 618 A.2d at 224 n.2.  
46. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1155.
47. Id.
48. The groups would most readily be determined by offense and class.  Thus, the six groups would be:
(1) Class A arson; (2) Class B burglary; (3) Class C burglary; (4) Class B theft; (5) Class C theft; and (6)
Class D theft.
example, in State v. Corbett, the Law Court vacated the sentence of a drug runner41
because, without minimizing the seriousness of the crimes, “in the hierarchy of drug
trafficking, that includes sales by street runners, dealers, wholesalers, and international
cartels, the activity of a runner, particularly one convicted of selling only a small
quantity of narcotics, must be considered to be a relatively less serious offense.”42  
Next, you are required to set the maximum period of incarceration.43  In doing so,
you should consider the factors particular to Mr. Lowell’s circumstance in order that
you “may appropriately individualize [his] sentence.”44  Here, you are asked to
evaluate the various aggravating and mitigating factors “peculiar to that offender.”45
Finally, as a third step in the process, you may suspend a portion of the period of
maximum incarceration if you determine that society will “better be protected by
affording a period of supervised probation.”46  Thus, the maximum period of
incarceration and the stated portion of that period that is suspended would be, when
implementing the so-called Hewey analysis, the final sentence you impose as the
sentencing court.47
In applying this framework to Jonathan Lowell’s many offenses, you are
immediately confronted with an awkward dilemma.  What factors can you consider
when placing Lowell’s “criminal conduct” on a scale of seriousness?  A rigid reading
of section 1252-C might lead you to understand that you have to set a basic sentence
for all nineteen counts.  Perhaps you could determine the basic sentence for groups of
crimes, thereby limiting your calculations.  However, Lowell’s counts are most readily
broken up into no less than six different groups.48  Even if you selected a representative
crime from each group, you would still need to determine the basic sentence for each.
You would need to place on a seriousness continuum, one count each of:  arson; theft
of over $500; theft of over $1,000; theft of a firearm, theft of over $10,000; burglary
of a residence; and burglary of a business.  Still, based on Mr. Lowell’s specific
circumstances, any one crime in a group might be more serious than the next.  Then a
another thought enters your deliberations:  if your goal is appropriately addressing the
broader course of criminal conduct, perhaps each offense is made more serious by the
conviction of multiple crimes in the crime spree.  Can you consider the spree itself in
evaluating the “criminal conduct”?  
2008] STATUTORY SENTENCING PROCEDURE 593
49. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1155.
50. See id.
51. Id.; see also State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990) (“It is not enough that the members
of this court might have passed a different sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err in
principle that we will alter it.”).  
52. Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1155.
53. Id.
54. See State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 15, 720 A.2d 573, 577 (in setting the basic period of
incarceration in step one “[t]he multiplicity of the offenses is not an impermissible factor”); State v. Brown,
1998 ME 129, ¶¶ 4, 12, 712 A.2d 513, 515, 517 (affirming sentence of fifty-nine years comprised of
consecutive terms of imprisonment for eight of thirty-three convicted counts of burglary, robbery, and
theft); State v. Frechette, 645 A.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Me. 1994) (approved process where judge used one
primary crime to meet incarceration objective, consecutive sentences to meet probation objective, and
concurrent sentences for the remainder of the crimes; however, the total sentence of eighty years, all but
eight years suspended, and twenty-four years of probation, when “considered in combination,” was
excessive).
Your analysis here is critical because of the standards of review clearly articulated
by the Law Court in Hewey.49  In the Law Court’s sentence review, different standards
of review are applied depending on which step of the Hewey analysis is at issue.50  The
first step in the process is reviewed for misapplication of principle.51  This standard is
less deferential than the abuse of discretion standard applied for the latter two.
Because the trial court is in a superior position to evaluate the factors “peculiar to the
particular offender,” the reviewing court grants greater deference to the weight and
effect given these individualized factors by the sentencing court in determining the
maximum period of incarceration and the amount that shall, if any, be suspended.52
However, the difficultly lies in defining the “principle” to be applied.  Placement of the
offense on a continuum of seriousness seems no less subjective than determining to
what degree an aggravating factor is outweighed by a mitigating one.  The Law Court
gave the following explanation in seeking to provide guidance to the sentencing courts:
Because of the two different standards applicable in our review of the sentencing
process, the desirability of a clear articulation by the trial court of its compliance with
the three-step procedure becomes apparent.  This articulation will aid us not only in
distinguishing and applying the appropriate standard of appellate review . . . but it
will also facilitate a greater degree of uniformity in the sentencing process.53
Considering the wrong factors during the first step of the analysis can easily lead to a
reversible sentence, which may put you right back where you started on remand.  
Cognizant that your sentence in this case should recognize the broader course of
the defendant’s criminal conduct, you decide not to rigidly apply section 1252-C and,
in the interest of fairness and efficiency, take a broader approach.  You explore
sentencing Mr. Lowell for his crime spree as an aggregate course of criminal conduct
that requires an overall sentence that will be sufficiently individualized while not
excessive.  Subsequent to the enactment of section 1252-C, the Law Court, in several
decisions, approved an aggregated method of sentencing.54  This process involves
consecutive, high sentencing on a few counts (facilitated by consideration of the crime
spree itself during the first step of the Hewey analysis) to achieve your overall
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55. See State v. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 31, 916 A.2d 210, 218 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
56. See State v. Miranda, 794 A.2d 506, 528 (Conn. 2002) (in sentencing for multiple offenses judges
often impose individual sentences for each crime “merely as component parts or building blocks of a larger
total punishment for the aggregate convictions”); see also People v. Calderon, 20 Cal.App.4th 82, 88  (Ct.
App. 1993) (“At some point a judge should evaluate the sentence in the aggregate.”); Hall v. State, 145 P.3d
605, 609 (Alaska 2006) (footnote omitted) (“When we review the composite sentence that a defendant has
received for two or more criminal convictions, our duty is to assess whether the composite sentence is
clearly mistaken, given the whole of the defendant’s conduct and history.”).
57. The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for a Class A crime is thirty years.  ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(A) (2006).  Considering the broader course of criminal conduct you
have the flexibility to impose a high sentence for the arson in order to achieve your overall sentencing
objective.
58. Perhaps the most important mitigating factor here would be the fact that Mr. Lowell has no prior
criminal record.  However, the effect on so many victims probably negates any benefit Mr. Lowell receives
for having not been caught previously.
59. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2) (2006).
60. Consecutive sentences must be constructed with careful consideration.  The statute permitting
consecutive and concurrent sentences reads in pertinent part:
3.  A defendant may not be sentenced to consecutive terms for crimes arising out of the same
criminal episode when:
. . . .
B.  One crime consists only of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation or other form of preparation to
commit, or facilitation of, the other;
Id.  § 1256(3)(B).  Basically, consecutive sentences cannot be imposed for separate charges that arise out
of the same incident.  For example, in the case of Jonathan Lowell, if one of the thefts was facilitated by
the Class B burglary (he broke in to the building and stole goods), the sentences for those crimes would
need to be imposed concurrently.
61. See id. § 1151(2).
sentencing objective and assigning concurrent sentences on the remainder.55  In
addition, other state courts have approved various aggregated approaches.56  
Now that you have settled on a framework, you attempt to set the sentence.  At the
sentencing hearing, pursuant to Rule 32, you provide your rationale.  Looking at the
crimes with which Jonathan Lowell is charged, the arson conviction seems the logical
choice for the primary sentence.  In light of the eighteen other crimes committed, you
set the basic period of incarceration for the Class A arson at thirty years.57  Next, you
evaluate the aggravating and mitigating factors, which in this case, you determine
results in no change and a maximum period of thirty years.58  You then suspend all but
twelve years of the sentence.  For one count of Class B burglary, you set a basic period
of incarceration of ten years and make no adjustments, setting a maximum period of
ten years.  You then suspend the entire sentence and impose it consecutively to the
primary sentence.  Each sentence carries a five year period of probation.  This results
in a total aggregate sentence of forty years, all but twelve years suspended, and ten
years of probation.  You set the sentences for the remaining seventeen counts at two-
thirds the statutory maximum59 and impose them concurrently to the primary sentence
for the arson.60  Finally you order $15,000 in restitution based on your determination
that Mr. Lowell will be capable, in the first nine years of his probation, of repaying this
amount.61  
In the interest of fairness and efficiency, you explain at the sentencing hearing that
you have imposed the sentence by considering the broader course of Mr. Lowell’s
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62. 2004 ME 41, 916 A.2d 210.
63. Id. ¶ 2, 916 A.2d at 211.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Brief on Behalf of the State of Maine-Appellee at 1, State v. Downs, 2007 ME 41, 916 A.2d 210
(No. SPR-05-422) [hereinafter Brief for the State].  Downs was indicted on the following seventy-six
counts:  sixteen counts of burglary of a residence, Class B; two counts of theft of a firearm, Class B; one
count of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class C; twenty-one counts of burglary, Class C; nine counts of theft,
Class C; seven counts of theft, Class D; and twenty counts of theft, Class E.  Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 3 n.1,
916 A.2d at 211 n.1.
68. ME. R. CRIM. P. 11.
69. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 3, 916 A.2d at 211.
70. Id. ¶ 9, 916 A.2d at 213; see also Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Downs, 2007 ME 41, 916 A.2d
210 (No. SRP-05-422).
71. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 4, 916 A.2d at 212.
72. Id.
73. Id.  Superior Court Justice Nancy Mills imposed the following sentences on the remaining counts:
Class B counts, six years to run concurrently with Count 3; Class C counts, five years all but two years
suspended, to run concurrently with Count 3 and two years probation; Class D counts, nine months,
concurrent with sentence imposed on Count 3; Class E counts, five months, concurrent with the sentence
on Count 3.  Id. at n.2.
conduct.  Rather than mechanically analyzing each offense pleaded to, you have chosen
an aggregated approach in order to save time and more effectively meet your burden
of achieving the goals of criminal punishment found in section 1151.  You are satisfied
that you have met this burden to the best of your human abilities.  Predictably, Mr.
Lowell appeals. 
II.  THE STATE V. DOWNS DECISION
In State v. Downs,62 Defendant Eugene Downs committed an extended string of
burglaries and thefts.63  With one or two accomplices, Downs burglarized several
unoccupied seasonal camps and businesses from January 2002 through September
2004.64  Some locations were targeted multiple times.65  As a result of a law
enforcement investigation, Downs was identified and eventually confessed and
provided information to police in their continuing investigation.66  On January 12,
2005, Eugene Downs was indicted by a Somerset County Grand Jury on thirty-eight
counts of burglary and thirty-eight counts of theft.67  At his Rule 11 proceeding,68
Downs, in an open plea, pleaded guilty to all seventy-six counts.69  
On May 6, 2005, Justice Nancy Mills, sitting in the Maine Superior Court for
Somerset County, imposed a sentence based, in part, on her application of the Hewey
analysis to the circumstances of the offenses.70  Downs was sentenced on Count 3,
Class B burglary, to ten years in prison with all but six years suspended and four years
of probation.71  On Count 11, Class B burglary, the court sentenced Downs to ten
years, all suspended, and four years probation to run consecutively to the sentence for
Count 3.72  On Count 40, Class B theft of a firearm, the court imposed a sentence of
ten years, all suspended, and four years of probation to run consecutively to the
sentence for Count 11.73  All told, Downs was sentenced to a maximum period of
incarceration totaling thirty years and an unsuspended period of six years.  In addition,
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74. Id. ¶ 5, 916 A.2d at 212.
75. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 6.
76. Id. at 7.  In fact, Downs argued that the court could not have appropriately concluded that these
burglaries were committed in the most serious manner of committing burglary.   Id. at 8.  The seasonal
camps were deliberately chosen to avoid any risk of confrontation, yet the court, Downs argued “specifically
refused to recognize that a break-in of a seasonal camp, known to be unoccupied, is of a less serious nature
than a nighttime home invasion involving a violent or dangerous confrontation.  Id. 
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id.
79. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 9, 916 A.2d at 213.
80. Id. 
81. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 7-8.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id.  Downs contended that the sentencing judge had inappropriately considered the fact that some
victims were burglarized more than once when setting the basic period of incarceration, and then again
when the maximum period was set.  Id.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 12.
he was ordered to pay $57,172.66 in restitution within the first eleven years of the
twelve year probationary period following his prison term.74  Downs appealed the
sentence to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court.
On appeal, Downs contended that the sentencing court erred in its application of
the Hewey analysis.75  He argued that the sentencing judge failed to compare his
conduct on a scale of seriousness against all the various means of committing burglary
or to determine where it fell on that continuum.76  Instead, the court immediately set
the basic period at the statutory maximum: ten years.77  Moreover, Downs contended
that the court cited inappropriate factors in determining the basic sentence.78  The court
indicated that it was considering, inter alia, the “number of burglaries” and the “sheer
amount of criminal activity” in determining that the basic period of incarceration
should be ten years on the Class B offenses.79  While Justice Mills had “no question
about it . . . on the Class B offenses,”80  Downs argued that, specifically, the number
of burglaries and the extended time period over which these crimes occurred were
impermissible factors in determining the basic period of incarceration.81  While Downs
conceded that some of the factors considered in step one might be “appropriate for
consideration as aggravating factors in the second step” of the Hewey analysis,82 he
urged that there was “nothing particularly serious” about any of the crimes committed
and, therefore, the court erred in not placing his crimes somewhere in the lower third
of the continuum of seriousness for each offense.83  
Downs also argued that the court abused its discretion when weighing the
aggravating and mitigating factors in step two because the court applied some factors
that had been used in step one, thereby “unfairly consider[ing] some aggravating
factors twice.”84  Furthermore, he contended that the court imposed illegal consecutive
sentences in violation of title 17-A, section 1256(3)(B).85  Downs’s contention was that
there were thirty-eight criminal episodes, each consisting of a burglary that facilitated
the accompanying theft.86  In the Brief for the Appellant, Attorney Jason Jabar
explained the alleged error:
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87. Id. at 11-12; see also id. at 12 n.2 (explaining that the sentence for Count 11 was illegal because
the sentence for Count 12 was made concurrent to the sentence for Count 3, and therefore, the sentence for
Count 11 ran consecutively to the sentence for Count 12).
88. Downs also argued that the final sentence was excessive because the sentences were consecutive.
Id. at 12.  His contention that his sentence was too harsh in light of his lack of prior criminal history was
met with a swift rebuff by the sentencing court.  Id. at 13.  Justice Mills found his lack of criminal history
to be most unpersuasive.  See Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 9, 916 A.2d at 213 (“He made basically a career for
sixteen months out of committing criminal offenses, . . . it’s almost disingenuous to say he had no prior
record when this sheer amount of criminal activity went on for this amount of time”).
89. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 15.  Restitution is authorized by statute.  ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1325(1) (2006).  In determining the amount of restitution authorized, the court must factor
in the present and future financial capacity of the offender to pay.  Id. § 1325(1)(C).  Additionally,
restitution is not authorized if the amount and method of payment creates “an excessive financial hardship
on the offender” based on, inter alia, present income and potential future earning capacity.  Id. §
1325(2)(D)(4).  However, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he is not capable of paying
the amount of restitution imposed by the court.  Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 10, 916 A.2d at 214.  In perhaps
questioning Downs’s ability to repay those he harmed, the Law Court made note of the fact that Downs
“attended high school through the eleventh grade and had a sporadic work history.”  Id. ¶ 5, 916 A.2d at
212.   
90. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 14.
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 14-15.
93. Brief for the State, supra note 67, at 12 (noting that “progressively the more burglaries the more
serious” each one becomes).
94. Id.
In this case, the offending sentences are for Count 39, Burglary (Class C) and for
Count 40, Theft of a Firearm (Class B).  The sentence for Count 39 was a sentence
of five years, with all but two years suspended, and three years of probation.  That
sentence was made concurrent with Count 3.  The sentence for Count 40 was a ten-
year sentence, all suspended, with four years of probation, and that sentence was
made consecutive to Count 3, which means it was made consecutive to Count 39.
However, Count 39, the burglary was committed against a business, Azziz Auto
Body, and so was Count 39 [sic] the theft of the firearm.87
In essence, Downs asked the Law Court to confirm that two crimes in one episode
could not be punished with consecutive sentences.88  
Finally, Downs argued that the sentencing court abused its discretion in
determining that he had the ability to pay $57,173.66 in probationary restitution.89
According to Downs, the court based this decision entirely on the testimony of his
mother that he was “very good at being a mechanic.”90  He contended that after six
years in jail and with seventy-six convictions, including forty-nine felonies, on his
record, it would be next to impossible to be able to pay back over $57,000 in eleven
years.91  Thus, when he inevitably fails to pay this amount, thereby violating the terms
of his probation, he will be forced back to prison for the remaining suspended period
of twenty-four years.92
In response, the State contended that there was no misapplication of principle in
setting the “basic sentence” under the Hewey analysis because, logically, the “sheer
number of the offenses makes an offense more serious.”93  The State argued that the
use of a weapon or the presence of a victim in the residence at the time of the burglary
were not the only factors capable of making an offense serious.94  The sentencing court
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95. Id. at 12-13.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 16.  In setting the basic sentence, the trial court looked at “the number of burglaries . . . [and]
that he burglarized places more than one time.”  Id.  In contrast, when evaluating the aggravating and
mitigating factors, “the Court considered the effects of the Appellant’s crimes on his victims.”  Id.  The
State argued that this was “not using the same factor twice.”  Id.  
98. Id. at 18.
99. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2006) (setting forth the statutory purposes
of the general sentencing provisions); see also supra note 14 (quoting the full text of § 1151).   
100. Brief for the State, supra note 67, at 18.
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 20.
104. Id.
105. State v. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 14, 916 A.2d 210, 215.
106. Id. ¶ 11, 916 A.2d at 213.
107. Id.
had found that sixteen Class B residential burglaries, including some repeat victims,
were serious enough to warrant the maximum allowable basic period of incarceration
for each offense.95  The State also argued that the sentencing judge had acted within
her discretion when setting the maximum period of incarceration by evaluating the
various aggravating and mitigating factors.96  The State also directly refuted Downs’s
contention that the sentencing court had applied the same factor, the number of crimes,
at two different steps in the analysis.97    
Furthermore, the State argued that the sentencing court properly exercised its
discretion in setting the final sentence in step three.98  In setting the final sentence in
accordance with step three of the Hewey analysis, the sentencing court turned to the
purposes of criminal punishment codified in section 1151.99  The sentencing court
emphasized several goals:  preventing crime through deterrence, encouraging restitu-
tion in all cases where the victim can be compensated, giving fair warning of the nature
of the sentences that could be imposed on the conviction of a crime, and minimizing
correctional experiences that might promote further criminality.100  The State posited
that, clearly in this case, the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion.101  Regarding
consecutive sentences, the State argued that the court properly exercised its discretion
in “impos[ing] consecutive sentences that did not result in an overall excessive
sentence.”102  However, the State conceded that some of the consecutive sentences had
been misaligned in violation of section 1256(3)(B).103  The State requested that
because the sentencing intention was “clear and legal,” Downs’s sentence should
merely be “structured so as to be in compliance with §1256(3).”104
By a 4-3 majority, the Law Court vacated the sentence and remanded it to the
superior court for resentencing.105  The majority held that the sentencing court failed
to place Downs’s crimes properly along a “continuum of means by which burglary and
theft crimes can be committed.”106  The counts selected did not justify imposition of
the maximum basic sentence because, in light of the lack of violence and the
intentional avoidance of confrontation, were Downs’s crimes to be placed on the
required continuum, they “must [have been] considered less serious than the most
serious ways of committing these offenses.”107  In addition, the court held that the
sentencing court also erred when it “took into consideration the number of crimes
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108. Id. ¶ 12, 916 A.2d at 213.   However, while factors “extrinsic to the particular nature and serious-
ness of the specific offense at issue, such as the number of other crimes committed,” were generally
irrelevant considerations at the first step of the analysis, they might be relevant if the crime was part of a
“multiplicity of offenses” that indicated a degree of planning undertaken to commit the crime at issue.  Id.
¶ 17, 916 A.2d at 214 (citing State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 15, 720 A.2d 573, 577 (child victim was
“groomed” to be abused through the development of a friendship with abuser over a period of months which
was betrayed by a series of sexual assaults)).
109. Id. ¶ 13, 916 A.2d at 214.
110. Id. ¶ 6, 916 A.2d at 212.
111. Id. 
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id. ¶ 12, 916 A.2d at 214.
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. ¶ 14, 916 A.2d at 214.
118. Id. ¶ 14 n.4, 916 A.2d at 214 n.4.
119. Id. 
committed when setting the basic sentences for individual Class B counts.”108
Therefore, the sentencing court misapplied principle “by failing to analyze properly the
particular nature and seriousness of the offense being sentenced and by considering
other crimes when determining the basic sentence for a particular crime.”109  
The majority viewed the selection of the sentencing process appropriate for
Downs’s case as one of first impression, stating that the court had “not previously
opined on the appropriate sentencing analysis when the defendant is convicted of
multiple crimes resulting from what appears to be a crime spree.”110  In addition, the
Legislature had not “enacted any statutes relating to the sentencing analysis for crime
sprees.”111  However, the court placed significant weight on the Legislature’s
“mandated” process for general sentencing.112  In so doing, the court concluded that the
three-step Hewey analysis was the “process to be followed whether the court is
sentencing a defendant for a single offense, several offenses, or as here, for multiple
crimes as part of a crime spree.”113  
While the court held that Downs’s sentence was miscalculated, the majority
recognized the infeasibility of applying the three-step analysis to seventy-six counts
individually.  In a case such as this, the court found it appropriate for the sentencing
court to “choose a representative or primary offense for analysis in the first step of the
Hewey process.”114  The court found the number of crimes to be an aggravating factor
relevant in setting the maximum sentence, but not until step two of the analysis should
the fact that Downs committed multiple offenses have been considered.115  The
majority held that “it is in the second Hewey step that the court can increase the basic
sentence because of the number of other offenses.”116
Because the court vacated Downs’s entire sentence, the majority failed to reach
several of his additional contentions, but did offer advice to the sentencing court upon
remand.117  In a footnote, the court instructed the superior court to “avoid a technical
error” in the original sentencing.118  The consecutive sentences indeed violated section
1256(3)(B), thus making the sentence illegal.119  In addition, the majority did not reach
the issue of the consecutive periods of probation creating a total period of probation
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120. Id. ¶ 14, 916 A.2d at 214.
121. See id. ¶ 14 n.5, 916 A.2d at 214 n.5. 
122. Id. ¶ 16, 916 A.2d at 215 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting). 
123. Id.  The “aggregated sentencing approach” is a process in which the sentencing judge imposes
“consecutive, high sentencing on a few counts to achieve the overall sentencing objective and then
concurrent sentences on the majority of the counts.”  Id. ¶ 31, 916 A.2d at 218 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
124. Chief Justice Saufley had concerns that a rigid application of the Hewey analysis might
“inappropriately consume the court’s time and resources.”  Id. ¶ 17 n.6, 916 A.2d at 215 n.6 (Saufley, C.J.,
dissenting). 
125. Id. ¶ 17, 916 A.2d at 215.
126. Id.  
127. Id. ¶ 18, 916 A.2d at 215. 
128. Id. 
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 15, 720 A.2d 573, 577.
long enough to pay “an otherwise impossibly large amount of restitution.”120  In
another footnote, the majority quoted the sentencing judge’s rationale for the extended
period of probation, perhaps questioning whether the restitution was excessive if a long
probation was needed to facilitate the payment of the amount ordered.121
In dissent, Chief Justice Saufley argued that the court erred in its legal analysis by
inappropriately assuming that the court in Hewey and the Legislature, in later codifying
the sentencing process, “both intended to apply Hewey’s individual crime, tri-partite
analysis to the sentencing of multiple offenses committed in a crime spree.”122  In
addition, Chief Justice Saufley argued that the court ignored its own precedent in
which the court “specifically approved the aggregated sentencing approach employed
by the sentencing judge in this case,” thereby invalidating an effective, reasonable, and
long-used sentencing process in Maine.123  While Chief Justice Saufley agreed that the
majority’s approach was an option,124 she contended that a judge confronted with the
prospect of sentencing an individual for a substantial series of crimes requires a
legitimate second sentencing option.125  In such cases, a judge could use the aggregated
sentencing approach applied by the judge in sentencing Downs.126
Chief Justice Saufley argued that section 1252-C did not contemplate the
sentencing predicament in which the superior court justice found herself.127  The
prospect of requiring a sentencing judge to rigorously perform the analysis for all
seventy-six counts would “complicate and obfuscate the sentencing process.”128  The
Chief Justice further pointed out that the majority attempted to solve this problem of
judicial economy by admitting the possibility that a judge might need only to perform
the analysis for a few representative offenses.129  This, however, was merely a “tacit
recognition that the . . . section 1252-C analysis simply does not work for crime spree
sentencing.”130  
In addition, Chief Justice Saufley offered that the same conclusion could be
reached through an examination of the court’s prior decisions.  In State v. Pfeil, the
Law Court held that a sentencing judge could consider the number of crimes
committed when setting the basic sentence during the first step, plainly stating that the
“multiplicity of the offenses is not an impermissible factor.”131  In several prior cases,
the court had approved the same aggregated sentencing approach the lower court had
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132. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 19, 916 A.2d at 215-16 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting). 
133. Id. ¶ 20, 916 A.2d at 216; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2006); supra note 14
(quoting the full text of § 1151).
134. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 24, 916 A.2d at 217 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. ¶ 26, 916 A.2d at 217 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
136. Id. ¶ 27, 916 A.2d at 217. 
137. Id. ¶¶ 28-31, 916 A.2d at 217-18.
138. Id. ¶ 33, 916 A.2d at 218. 
139. Id. ¶ 40, 916 A.2d at 220; see, e.g., State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶¶ 9-19, 720 A.2d 573, 577-78;
State v. Brown, 1998 ME 129, ¶¶ 11-12, 712 A.2d 513, 517; State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶¶ 19-34, 745
A.2d 368, 374-77.  
140. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 39 n.8, 916 A.2d at 220 n.8; see HOWARD H. DANA JR. & LEIGH I.
SAUFLEY, SENTENCING STATISTICS FOR ALL CRIMES CHARGED IN FISCAL YEAR 1997 IN ALL SUPERIOR
COURTS IN THE STATE OF MAINE (2001).  Justice Alexander noted that this was the only comprehensive
study of Maine Superior Court sentencing statistics.  Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 39 n.8, 916 A.2d at 220 n.8.
141. Downs, 2007 ME 41, ¶ 41, 916 A.2d at 220. 
142. Id. (citing DANA & SAUFLEY, supra note 140).
applied in this case.132  Chief Justice Saufley argued that a sentencing judge should be
allowed to consider the broader course of criminal conduct when determining a
sentence that fulfills the statutorily defined purposes of sentencing.133  She would have
held that a judge sentencing for a crime spree should have the discretion to use the
Hewey analysis for each offense, or to use the aggregated approach previously
approved by the court.134  
Justice Alexander wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority’s
approach was wholly against “long-standing, well-accepted, and often utilized trial
court practice for sentencing individuals convicted, at one time, of multiple, serious
felonies.”135  He took umbrage with the majority’s statement that the court had not
previously “opined on” the appropriate sentencing analysis for multiple crimes.136  As
Chief Justice Saufley did, Justice Alexander cited several cases in which the court had
approved consideration of multiple crimes in the first part of the sentencing analysis
and approved the aggregated approach utilized by the sentencing court in this case.137
Additionally, he argued that section 1256, authorizing concurrent and consecutive
sentences, was legislative approval of the aggregated sentencing approach.138  
Justice Alexander argued that in practice, judges imposing sentences for multiple
crimes in a crime spree had:  
(i) considered the crimes as a group; (ii) determined the overall sentence desired to
be achieved; (iii) selected a few of the more serious crimes; (iv) imposed maximum
or near maximum and consecutive sentences on those few to achieve the overall
sentencing objective; and then (v) imposed lower, concurrent sentences for most of
the crimes being sentenced.139
He also analyzed a report of sentencing statistics for 1997 produced by Justices Dana
and Saufley.140  The study examined 438 Class B burglaries which often involved
sentencing for multiple offenses.141  On 224 occasions, the Class B burglary was
sentenced as a primary offense that “received the highest sentence in cases where
multiple offenses were sentenced simultaneously.”142  Justice Alexander argued that
these primary offense sentences necessarily considered other pending charges in order
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150. Id. ¶ 36, 916 A.2d at 219. 
151. Id. ¶ 37, 916 A.2d at 219. 
152. Id. ¶ 48, 916 A.2d at 222.
153. Id. ¶ 20, 916 A.2d at 216 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting).
154. See id. ¶ 6, 916 A.2d at 212 (majority opinion).
to achieve the appropriate overall sentencing objective.143  He cited five cases in which
the court had approved the consideration of multiple crimes in setting the sentence for
the primary offense.144  He argued that “such a well-accepted, responsibly employed
practice cannot be a ‘misapplication of principle.’”145  
In addition to arguing that the majority ignored legislative history, trial court
practice, and the court’s own precedent, Justice Alexander contended that the “one-
crime-at-a-time sentencing regime” imposed by the court was a waste of judicial
resources146 and, in the case of Downs, merely resulted in harmless error.147  He
contended that the majority’s opinion suggested that the trial court erred merely by
considering the multiple offenses in the first step of the Hewey analysis rather than the
second.148  Similarly, if the trial court had considered the planning undertaken by
Downs for the multiple offenses, perhaps it would not have been error at all.149  Justice
Alexander questioned the logic of vacating this sentence and suggested it should be
harmless error when the trial court would have been correct “had it mentioned the
multiple felonies just a few sentences later in its sentencing analysis.”150  He argued
further that the court’s refusal to invoke harmless error analysis indicated that:  (1) the
court had “more fundamental objections than are articulated in its opinion”151; and (2)
the court utilized its sentence review authority to “overturn a sentence it deem[ed] too
long.”152
III.  STATE V. DOWNS WRONGLY DENIED THE SENTENCING JUDGE THE DISCRETION TO
CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT’S BROADER COURSE OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT
The Downs court woodenly applied the codified sentencing procedure, thereby
denying the legitimacy and necessity of considering the broader course of the
offender’s conduct when imposing a sentence for multiple crimes.  As Chief Justice
Saufley illuminated in her dissent, sentencing judges must be enabled by the sentencing
process to “reach sentences that serve the statutory purposes of sentencing.”153  The
majority decision unnecessarily constricts the ability of the sentencing judge to perform
those very duties by giving section 1252-C more weight than it deserves.  From the
start, the majority seemed more concerned with what process the Legislature had
“mandated”154 than with the true purposes of the criminal sanction.  
The majority effectively closed the door through which many sentencing judges
had passed in reaching fair and efficient sentences.  Especially when confronted with
a sentencing task of this magnitude, judges must be allowed a certain degree of
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creativity in imposing sentences.  By previously approving an aggregated approach
when an offender had committed multiple serious crimes, or gone on a crime spree, a
necessary alternative to strict application of the Hewey analysis was maintained.
Rigidly applying the tri-partite analysis of section 1252-C to all of Down’s seventy-six
counts would indeed “complicate and obfuscate the sentencing process.”155  In fact,
such an application may result in a sentence that runs afoul of some of the purposes
found in section 1151.  An excessively long sentence, the result of the sheer number
of offenses committed, might not appropriately “minimize correctional experiences that
may promote further criminality.”156  On the other hand, a sentence might diminish the
gravity of the offenses if each offence, examined in a vacuum, only warrants a small
punishment.157  The majority opinion acknowledged that a sentencing court could
perhaps undertake the three-part analysis for a few representative or primary offenses
and forgo the strict application on the remainder.158   However, this undermines the
majority opinion that each and every crime should be evaluated, thereby indicating that
each and every crime is unique in its placement on the seriousness continuum.  Strict
application of section 1252-C for crime spree sentencing simply does not work.
Sentencing judges will, from time to time, be presented with cases that require
more than routine accounting work or checking the right boxes.  Statutorily guided
creativity, not mandated process, is the only way to reach sentences that serve the
purposes of criminal punishment while remaining fair and efficient.  The judge should
have the discretion, in sentencing multiple crimes at the same time, to apply the section
1252-C analysis to each crime or use the aggregated and broader approach.  Chief
Justice Saufley’s rationale is wholly on point:
A sentencing judge who has both options is better able to enter a sentence that
prevents crime through deterrence, rehabilitation, and restraint of offenders;
encourages the payment of restitution; minimizes correctional experiences that
promote further criminality; communicates to the broader community the type of
sentence that may be imposed upon conviction of an offense; eliminates inequalities
in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological goals; encourages
differentiation to promote just, individualized sentences; and acknowledges the
gravity of the offense.159
Moreover, it is only through contemplation and recognition of the broader course of
criminal conduct that one judge may hope to achieve these goals.
The majority opinion held that the number of crimes committed was not a
permissible factor to be used during the first step of the section 1252-C sentencing
process.  In doing so, they effectively overruled the finding in Pfeil that a sentencing
judge could take the multiple crimes into consideration when setting the basic sentence.
More significantly, the majority narrowly construed section 1252-C, subsection 1.  The
statute calls a sentencing judge to consider the “nature and seriousness of the offense
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as committed by the offender.”160  The statute does not indicate that “the offense”
should be interpreted as “each offense.”  Too narrowly interpreting the language of
section 1252-C was incorrect because it failed to consider the concept of the broader
course of criminal conduct.  Ultimately each offense becomes more serious when
coupled with additional serious offenses.  One burglary alone is not as serious as one
burglary that was part of a string of ten in three months.  
The majority found that, because the multiplicity of offenses was considered
during the first step of the “mandated” analysis, a misapplication of principle occurred
on the part of the sentencing judge.  However, the question becomes:  what principle?
The 4-3 split of the court clearly indicates that the “principle” is not so clear.  Perhaps
it is not plausible to set a bright line principle about what factors are to be considered
in the first part of the analysis and which are to be considered in the latter phases and
therefore subject only to abuse of discretion review.  The misapplication of principle
standard should depend on the sentencing court’s discretion to choose the appropriate
sentencing approach, the court’s recognition of the broader course of criminal conduct,
and its responsibility to “set forth on the record the reasons for the sentence.”161  
The majority’s rigidity and machine-like analysis generates an interesting question
about the underlying rationale for the decision.  Justice Alexander in dissent leaps to
the conclusion that the majority thought the sentence was “too long.”162  If the majority
felt that the sentence was excessive, they could have vacated the sentence on that
ground.  But they failed to reach that issue.  It remains unclear why the sentence was
vacated for the judge applying the wrong factor at the wrong time.  Justice Alexander
makes a fair point when he argues that this should merely be harmless error,163 but the
majority obviously did not seem to think a misapplication of principle was harmless.
However, forcing the sentencing court to resentence Downs is counter to any notion
of judicial economy.  One could easily presume that the sentencing judge could simply
use the multiplicity of offenses as an aggravating factor and issue the same sentence.164
This, most certainly, was not the unstated rationale behind vacating the entire sentence.
Perhaps the majority’s rationale was lost in the fog of trying to forcibly apply a rigid,
legislatively “mandated” sentencing process to a case in which it was utterly
unworkable.  
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IV.  POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
The majority decision in State v. Downs held that the sentencing process that the
Legislature “mandated” in section 1252-C be generally employed for sentencing was
the process to be followed “whether the court is sentencing a defendant for a single
offense, several offenses or, as here, for multiple crimes as part of a crime spree.”165
In doing so, the majority placed too much emphasis on the form of the process to be
used and failed to recognize the ultimate function of the criminal sentencing process.
The purpose of the Hewey analysis is to provide sentencing judges with a framework
from which to meet their requirement found in Rule 32.166  The subsequent articulation
of that analysis assists the appellate court in reviewing the sentence on appeal.167
However, the ultimate purpose of criminal sanction remains the meeting of the goals
set forth in section 1151.  These “purposes,” coupled with the offender’s broader
course of criminal conduct, are the foundation upon which Rule 32, the appellate
review process, the Hewey analysis, and the aggregated approach are built.  
A legislative solution is the proper course of action to rectify the dilemma
presented by the majority’s decision.  The simplest course would be to amend the
statute to give sentencing courts the flexibility to employ other options.  This could be
achieved by merely changing the word “shall” to “may.”  The first sentence of the
statute could be amended to read:  
In imposing a sentence alternative pursuant to section 1152 that includes a term of
imprisonment relative to murder, a Class A, Class B, or Class C crime, in setting the
appropriate length of that term as well as any unsuspended portion of that term
accompanied by a period of probation, the court may employ the following 3-step
process . . . . 
This change would allow a trial judge to follow a different pathway to an appropriate
sentence if presented with a case that warranted a broader approach.  However, the fact
that the Law Court’s sentencing analysis was codified, while other equally appropriate
approaches were not, intentionally or unintentionally favors the use of one method over
others.  Amending the statute will provide flexibility, but sentencing judges may still
find themselves forced to think within a rigid framework before considering the
broader course of conduct or the purposes of criminal sanction.  
Moreover, State v. Downs is potentially the leading edge of what inevitably might
be a string of cases in which sentencing courts feel compelled to follow the framework
set out in section 1252-C when it may not be the best or most practical approach.  In
light of the majority decision, the statute appears not to allow for a broader and
aggregated process in the case of an extensive crime spree.  However, the question then
becomes:  What about the next case on which the Law Court has not “previously
opined”?168  Amending the statute would alleviate the problem, but it is not a solution.
Considering the importance of observing the broader course of conduct and the
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ultimate purposes of the criminal law, this problem demands a more permanent
solution.
A better course is to repeal section 1252-C.  As Chief Justice Saufley asserted, the
Hewey analysis is not the only process or option that needs to be in the sentencing
judges’ tool bag when it comes to a complex sentencing task.169  Moreover, over-
emphasizing the three-step process to be followed by judges while neglecting broader
objectives pushes the judge to focus primarily on the form of the sentence rather than
its overall function.  The statute paved the way for the decision in Downs in which the
statutory process was deemed the only process by which a sentence may be calculated.
The statute, even if amended, grants too much weight to the Hewey procedure and
supplants analysis of legislative intent for careful reflection of Supreme Judicial Court
precedent.  Moreover, the mystery of what exactly the “principle” is that must be
applied in the first step makes it difficult to believe that the Legislature intended for the
sentencing courts to cease to use their sound judgment and for the Law Court to vacate
sentences on technicalities of narrow statutory construction.  
V.  CONCLUSION
In 2005, the Criminal Law Advisory Commission submitted a bill to the Maine
Legislature entitled An Act To Eliminate the 3-step Sentencing Procedure Relating to
the Imposition of Sentencing Alternatives That Include Imprisonment.170  Specifically,
the proposed act repealed section 1252-C and proposed enacting section 1252-D which
would read:
The procedure for imposition of a sentence that includes a term of imprisonment
relative to murder or a Class A, B, or C crime must be as set forth in the Maine Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32(a)(3) and as determined by the Law Court in cases
involving appellate review of sentences.171
Essentially, the proposed statute required that the sentencing court “set forth on the
record the reasons for the sentence”172 and apply the procedure appropriate for the
individual case whether it be individual Hewey analyses or a broader, aggregated
approach.  The bill was submitted to the Criminal Justice and Public Safety Committee
of the Maine Legislature.173  After discussions and debate, the committee submitted a
report and unanimously recommended that the bill ought not to pass.174  
This bill should be re-proposed during the next session of the Maine Legislature.
Repealing section 1252-C and replacing it with section 1252-D175 better serves the
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purposes of criminal sentencing because it properly places the emphasis of the analysis
on those very purposes.  It allows for the judicial creativity necessary to impose fair
and equitable sentences while keeping judicial economy and efficiency in mind.
Moreover, it allows the sentencing judge to consider the broader course of criminal
conduct when confronted with seventy-six counts of burglary and theft.  
State v. Downs is a stark example of the sentencing procedure in title 17-A, section
1252-C unnecessarily hamstringing a sentencing judge into rigidly following a process
that was wholly inadequate for the task at hand.  Repealing section 1252-C will restore
the sentencing judges’ discretion to choose the appropriate sentencing tool applicable
to the cases in front of them.  Sentences should be vacated if the sentence does not
sufficiently meet the purposes of criminal sanction.  Sentences should not be vacated
because, while the sentence was a fair sentence in light of the broader course of
criminal conduct, the judge miscalculated.  Judges need the flexibility to use their
discretion in selecting a process that will meet the purposes of imprisonment and
punishment, without being restricted by an unworkable process.  The majority in
Downs restricted the options necessary for a sentencing court to properly meet its
burden of imposing sentences that fulfill the aims of the criminal law.  The statute
forced the majority to place form over function and, like a grade-school math test, the
sentence was given a failing grade, not because the answer was wrong, but because the
sentencing judge did not show her work within the box. 
